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THE PRIVATE SECTOR AMENDMENT TO AUSTRALIA'S
PRIVACY ACT: A FIRST STEP ON THE ROAD TO
PRIVACY
Alexandra T. McKayt
Abstract: Global and national transfers of personal information and data
protection laws meant to regulate such transfers will have a significant impact on the
growing Internet. Yet vastly different philosophies on how to protect individuals'
personal information from theft or misuse by the private sector have led to very different
regulatory models throughout the world. In the industrialized world, the European
Union's approach, a universally applicable, comprehensive data protection law,
occupies one end of the regulatory spectrum, while a self-regulatory scheme like the
United States' stakes out the other end. Australia's Private Sector Privacy Act
Amendment ("2000 Amendment") lies somewhere in between. Australia's 2000
Amendment has been called "co-regulatory" or "light touch" regulation partly because
it was meant to allay citizens' increasing privacy concerns, yet not impose a significant
regulatory burden on industry.
Australia 's Private Sector Privacy Bill was touted as an innovative compromise
between costly state regulation and ineffective self-regulation. However, some of the
concessions made in the name of flexibility and de-regulation have resulted in a weak
regulatory scheme that produces inconsistent and ineffective information privacy
protection. In particular, the small business exemption and the limited enforcement
mechanisms weaken the 2000 Amendment so much as to call into question whether
Australia's information privacy law is merely a baby step away from self-regulation
rather than a happy medium on the regulatory scale. If the 2000 Amendment is to
provide Australians with the substantive privacy protections it sets forth, legislators
should fix two flaws in the next round of private sector privacy regulation. First, they
should close or phase out the small business exemption. Second, in order to give effect to
the substantive provisions of the Amendment, the law should allow more effective
enforcement by using a system of appropriate penalties that escalate according to the
degree of non-compliance. These changes would provide more thorough protection of
Australians 'privacy, yet would not reduce the benefits derived from the "co-regulatory"
model.
1. INTRODUCTION
The advent of the Internet and flourishing of electronic commerce
have created opportunities as well as perplexing problems. Data is more
easily obtained, stored, transferred, and used than ever before.1 Individuals'
personal information is gathered with ease and is considered economically
t The author thanks Professor Jane Winn and the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal staff for their
comments and support.
I Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal
Information, 74 WASH. L. REv. 1033, 1035-37 (1999).
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and socially valuable.2 At the same time, in the last ten years, electronic
communication and the World Wide Web have enabled businesses to
globalize while expanding their markets and operations. Information
gathering and globalization have caused a complex problem to emerge: how
can the world harmonize data protection laws so that businesses and
organizations can take advantage of foreign markets? At the heart of the
problem is the fact that the approach to information privacy varies
significantly around the world. In the European Union ("E.U."), the Data
Protection Directive sets forth a number of principles related to the
collection of personal data, granting to individuals what are essentially
extensive rights to information privacy.3  This Directive prevents data
transfers to countries that do not have equivalent data protection.4  In
contrast, U. S. Law grants no official, or unofficial, right to information
privacy.5 Though sectoral U.S. privacy laws target certain industries,
6
efforts to enact generally applicable data protection legislation have been
fruitless, as industry has come to rely upon the relatively free exchange of
information to conduct business. Instead, businesses are expected to self-
regulate their data protection practices.7
In the middle of the spectrum between the E.U. and U.S. systems is
Australia's approach, often called a "co-regulatory" or "light touch"
approach.8 Australia enacted a Private Sector Amendment to its Privacy Act
(1988) in 2000 ("2000 Amendment"), hoping to strike a balance between
Australian citizens' desire for protection of their personal information, and
businesses' request for flexible guidelines that would not create an
expensive regulatory burden.
9
2 ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CTR. IN ASSOCIATION WITH PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL,
PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 2003: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF PRIVACY LAWS AND DEVELOPMENTS
79 (2003) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL SURVEY].
3 See infra Part II.A.
4 Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 25.1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 3 1, available at http://www.europa.eu.
int/smartapi/cgi/sgadoc?smartapicelexapi!prodCELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=31995L0046&model
=guichett (last visited Jan. 14, 2005) [hereinafter E.U. Directive].
5 See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 9 (1996); Steven R. Salbu,
Corporate Governance, Stakeholder Accountability, and Sustainable Peace: The European Union Data
Privacy Directive and International Relations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 655, 691-92 (2002).
7 Salbu, supra note 5, at 667.
Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for Consumer Transactions in Electronic Commerce. Why
Self-regulation is Inadequate, 49 S.C. L. REV. 847, 860 (1998).
Paul Kelly, Recent Developments in Private-Sector Personal Data Protection in Australia. Will
There Be an Upside Down Under?, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 71, 80, 85 (2000).
9 See id. at 85; Federal Privacy Commissioner, Submission to Standing Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs 5, May 2000, available at http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/hor.pdf (last
visited Jan. 14, 2005) [hereinafter F.P.C. Submission]; Coles Myer, Submission to Standing Committee on
Legal and Constitutional Affairs 5, May 11, 2000, at http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/laca/Privacy
bill/sub24.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
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While it appears that the 2000 Amendment is meant to steer a
politically acceptable middle course between the E.U. and U.S. approaches,
some aspects of the law weaken it by producing inconsistent and ineffective
privacy protection. The first flaw is that it exempts 94% of businesses from
its coverage.' 0 Second, it does not provide sufficient mechanisms to enforce
privacy law." Australia should consider strengthening its private sector
privacy law to provide consistent and fair application of its substantive
provisions. Because the political process can be slow, now is the time to
begin work on the changes that are needed.'
2
To provide more effective information privacy protection, the
Australian law should be amended to address its two major shortcomings.
First, the small business exemption should be eliminated or narrowed to
cover fewer businesses. Second, more extensive enforcement, including a
predictable pyramid of increasing penalties for violations, as well as harsher
penalties for the most egregious offenders, is needed to ensure the law is
followed.
This Comment describes the shortcomings of the 2000 Amendment
and argues that they seriously weaken the law. It suggests some relatively
simple changes that would address those shortcomings and provide better
uniformity in application and enforcement of the law, thereby increasing
information privacy protection for Australian citizens.
Part II of this Comment describes the international context and history
of data protection laws and chronicles the development of Australia's
privacy law. Part III discusses the weaknesses of Australia's Private Sector
Privacy Amendment. Finally, Part IV suggests changes that would
neutralize those weaknesses.
II. GLOBAL AND NATIONAL STANDARDS REFLECT A WIDE RANGE OF
REGULATORY APPROACHES TO PRIVACY PROTECTION
Information Privacy' 3 has been the subject of national and
international regulation for decades and is becoming an increasingly serious
10 See Patrick Gunning, Central Features ofAustralia's Private Sector Privacy Law, 7 PRIVACY LAW
AND POLICY REPORTER 1 (2001), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/CyberLRes/2001/2/ (last
visited Jan. 14, 2005).
" See infra Part III.B.
12 This is especially true given that it took years for the first private sector privacy law to pass,
despite relatively wide support. Kelly, supra note 8, at 80-85.
Privacy is a vague concept covering a vast area of the law. This Comment focuses on information
privacy, "which involves the establishment of rules governing the collection and handling of personal data
such as credit information, and medical and government records. It is also known as 'data protection."'
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 2, at 3. Other types of privacy, such as bodily privacy or domestic
privacy, are beyond the scope of this topic.
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concern. Because of the globalization of markets and increased use of the
Internet, data protection laws are bound to become a major source of
contention in the push to increase international commerce. In fact, these
laws have already created tension: those who wish to utilize the "boundary
free" nature of the Internet are realizing that data protection laws create de
facto boundaries that can be just as effective as physical borders. 14
Information privacy is an important national concern as each country tries to
bolster confidence in online business by providing data protection that its
citizens want, without creating excessive regulatory compliance costs.
15
Information privacy concerns arose long before the Internet, however, and
have been the subject of policies and regulations throughout the world for
many years.
A. International and European Privacy Laws Set Forth General Privacy
Guidelines
In 1980, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD"), 16 prompted by the increased use of computers to
store data as well as the need for international standards of privacy
protection, 7 issued Privacy Guidelines ("Guidelines"). 8 These Guidelines
articulated fair information practices deemed necessary to protect
individuals' privacy.' 9 The Guidelines require that data only be used for the
purposes for which the individual has given consent.20  Data is to be
protected by reasonable security safeguards,2' data policies will be open and
14 See Simon Hayes, Privacy Bill Not Up to Standard: EU, THE AUSTRALIAN, June 27, 2000; Joel R.
Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1315, 1318-19 (2000); Barbara Crutchfield George et al., U.S. Multinational Employers: Navigating
Through the "Safe Harbor" Principles to Comply with the E. U. Data Privacy Directive, 38 AM. BUS. L.J.
735, 736 (2001).
15 See INTERNATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 2, at 9.
I6 The OECD is a global organization of thirty member countries "sharing a commitment to
democratic government and the market economy." OECD, About OECD, at http://www.oecd.org/about
/0,2337,en 2649_201185 1 1_1 1 _,00.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2005). The OECD produces
publications and statistics as well as instruments, decisions and recommendations. Id. Members include the
U.S., the U.K., many western European Countries, Japan, and Australia among others. OECD, OECD
Member Countries, at http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en 2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,
00.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
17 Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461,
466 (2000).
18 OECD, GUIDELINES ON GOVERNING THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF
PERSONAL DATA, Sept. 23, 1980, 20 I.L.M. 422 (1981), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/l 8/
0,2340,en2649_34255_1815186 1_1 1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2005) [hereinafter OECD
Guidelines] (recommending a set of standards for adoption in member countries).
19 Id. §§ 7-14.
20 Id.§7.
2' Id. § 10.
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readily discoverable, and individuals will have the right to access their
personal data.22
In 1981, the Council of Europe ("COE") also responded to the rapid
expansion of electronic data processing by establishing the Convention for
the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data ("Convention 108").23 Like the OECD's guidelines and the
E.U.'s later Data Protection Directive, Convention 108 set out principles that
applied to those who gathered personal data. These principles are very
similar to the OECD's principles and include how data can be collected,
stored, used, and accessed.24 COE member states that are contracting states
to Convention 108 are bound by its principles.25  Whether a country is a
26contracting party is entirely voluntary. Though Convention 108 offers
good protections, the more recent widespread electronic collection of
personal data prompted the European Union to go further.
Influenced by both the OECD guidelines and Convention 108, in 1995
the European Parliament passed the Data Protection Directive ("E.U.
Directive").27  The E.U. Directive essentially follows the OECD Privacy
Guidelines. 28  It is considered one of the strongest information data
protection laws in the world.29 The E.U. Directive covers all sectors of E.U.
member states' economies and grants strong protection to data containing
individuals' personal information.30 Individuals are given the right to sue
over alleged breaches, and member states have an obligation to form
government privacy agencies that will enforce the law and educate the
public on privacy.31  The E.U. Directive uses the "opt-in" approach to
communications whereby an individual must give consent before an
organization sends any communications to the individual.32  The E.U.
Directive also requires non-E.U. countries to have "adequate" levels of
22 Id. §§ 12, 13.
23 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data, Jan. 28, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 317, E.T.S. No. 108 (entered into force Oct. 1, 1985) [hereinafter
Convention 108]; COUNCIL OF EUROPE, BACKGROUND, at http://www.coe.intfT/E/Legal%5Faffairs[Legal
%5Fco%2Doperation/Data%5Fprotection/Background/lBackground.asp#TopOfPage (last visited Jan. 14,
2005).
24 Convention 108, supra note 23.
25 id.
26 id.
27 E.U. Directive, supra note 4.
28 Id. arts. 5-21.
29 Jane E. Kirtley, Privacy and the Press in the New Millennium: How International Standards are
Driving the Privacy Debate in the United States and Abroad, 23 U. ARK. LIrLE ROCK L. REV. 69, 74
(2000).
30 Salbu, supra note 5, at 668, 689.
31 E.U. Directive, supra note 4, art. 22.
31 Id. art. 7.
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privacy protection if information is to be transferred from the E.U. to those
countries.33 This particular provision has created tension between Europe
and other countries whose approaches to information privacy are less
comprehensive and stringent. 34 The E.U. Directive has therefore become a
35benchmark on the global privacy scene.
B. The United States Regulates Information Privacy Through Sector-
Specific Laws and Self-Regulation
The self-regulatory and sectoral model of the United States provides a
sharp contrast to the European Union's comprehensive Data Protection
legislation. 36 The U.S. federal government regulates information privacy in
some sectors of the economy (hence the term "sectoral" model). Examples
include the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which regulates credit reporting
companies' data protection practices, 7 and the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act, which regulates health care providers' use of
personal health information.38 The Freedom of Information Act as well as
the Privacy Act regulate only the federal government's use of personal
information. 39 Other than such sector-specific data protection laws, there is
no comprehensive national data protection law in the United States.
Businesses that do not fall under sector-specific laws (including many
online and e-commerce businesses) have been encouraged by the U.S.
government to self-regulate their use of personal data. 40 Self-regulation has
been widely criticized as an inadequate strategy to protect personal data and
privacy. 41 The U.S. Federal Trade Commission issued a report in 2000 that
questioned the ability of self-regulation to keep pace with the increase in
online business and recommended that Congress enact data protection
legislation that applied to all online businesses.4 2 Members of Congress
have introduced over two hundred bills dealing with information privacy
33 Id. art. 25. 1.
34 George et al., supra note 14, at 736.
35 Salbu, supra note 5, at 691-92.
36 Jordan M. Blanke, "Safe Harbor" and the European Union's Directive on Data Protection, 11
ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 57, 69 (2000).
17 15 U.S.C. § 1681 - § 168 1x (2004); see Blanke, supra note 36, at 67.
" 42 U.S.C. § 1320d - § 1320d-8 (2004); Nick Littlefield & Colin Zick, HIPAA: New Federal
Privacy Rules and Their Implications, 46 B.B.J. 14 (2002).
3 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2004); 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2004).
4o Budnitz, supra note 7, at 860.
41 See generally Budnitz, supra note 7; INTERNATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 2, at 4.
42 FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ON-LINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES N THE ELECTRONIC
MARKETPLACE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/
privacy2000.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
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since January of 2001, but none have passed.43
C. Australia's Private Sector Privacy Law Uses a Co-regulatory
Paradigm to Apply Old Privacy Principles to the Private Sector
Information Privacy Protection is not new to Australia. Australia's
government agencies have been required to comply with privacy protection
principles for sixteen years. It was only in the year 2000 that the private
sector was brought under the umbrella of Australia's privacy law.
1. The Privacy Act of 1988 Requires the Australian Government to
Adhere to Privacy Principles
Australia enacted privacy legislation that applied to government
agencies in 1988." The Privacy Act included a list of Information Privacy
Principles similar to the OECD guidelines. 45  These principles include
limitations and guidelines on how the data can be collected, used, stored,
accessed, and corrected.46 The Privacy Act also established the office of the
Federal Privacy Commissioner, an agency responsible for promoting "an
Australian culture that respects privacy.
47
2. The 2000 Amendment to the Privacy Act Applies the Privacy
Principles to Part of the Private Sector
Towards the end of the 1990s, pressure from diverse interest groups
(including businesses, consumers, and government agencies) increased to•48
enact a privacy law that would govern the private sector. Among the
reasons for such pressure were the desire to allay Australian citizens'
privacy concerns in the hopes that they would increase their use of electronic
43 INTERNATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 2, at 529. For example a number of bills on a number of
topics have been introduced such as, The Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 69, 108th Cong.
(2003), The Social Security Online Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 70, 108th Cong. (2003), The Consumer
Identity and Information Security Act of 2003, H.R. 2617, 108th Cong. (2003), and The Privacy Act of
2003, S. 745, 108th Cong. (2003). For a listing of privacy related bills in the U.S., see EPIC, TRACKING
PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND CYBER-LIBERTIES BILLS IN THE 108TH CONGRESS, at http://www.epic.org/privacy
/bill track.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
4 The Privacy Act, 1988 (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/
pa1988108/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
41 Id. § 14.
46 Id.
17 FED. PRIVACY COMM'R, ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2003), available at http://www.privacy.gov.au/
publications/03asnrep.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2005) [hereinafter 2003 Annual Report].
48 Kelly, supra note 8, at 80-81.
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commerce, 49 the need for national information privacy standards instead of a
potentially confusing mix of state laws,50 and the desire to transfer data to
and from Europe where the E.U. Directive requires "adequate" privacy
protection measures in the non-European country.
After many false starts and a highly politicized battle,52 the Privacy
Amendment (Private Sector) Bill 2000 passed. It was hoped that the 2000
Amendment would satisfy three goals: 1) increase consumer confidence in
Internet transactions,53 2) harmonize data protection laws within Australia by
preempting different approaches from each State and Territory, and 3) meet
the E.U. Directive's standards so that Australian businesses would not be at
a global disadvantage.54
The 2000 Amendment took effect in December 2001. 5' The
Amendment includes a list of National Privacy Principles ("NPPs") that
apply to the processing of personal information.56 Those principles include:
49 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, Privacy
Amendment (Private Sector) Bill 2000, Explanatory Memorandum 7 (2000), available at
http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/Repository/Legis/oldEms/Linked/23010118.pdf (last visited Jan. 14,
2005) Jhereinafter Explanatory Memorandum]; Kelly, supra note 8, at 80, 83.
50 Kelly, supra note 8, at 80, 83.
51 Id. As of June 28, 2004, the European Union does not consider Australia's privacy law to be
adequate. THE EUROPEAN COMM'N, COMMISSION DECISIONS ON THE ADEQUACY OF THE PROTECTION OF
PERSONAL DATA IN THIRD COUNTRIES (2004), at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal market/privacy/
adequacyen.htrn (last visited Jan. 14, 2005). The E.U. cites multiple characteristics of the 2000
Amendment as inadequate including the small business exemption, the exemption for employee records, as
well as a number of other provisions of the 2000 Amendment. European Commission, Submission to
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Conceming its Inquiry into the Privacy
Amendment (Private Sector) Bill 2000, at 3, at http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/laca/PrivacybillU
sub1 13.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2005) [hereinafter E.C. Submission]. The small business exemption is
discussed in detail, infra Part III.A. There are other significant flaws relating to enforcement that the
Commission did not mention and that are discussed, infra Part III.B.
52 Karen Dearne, Privacy Free Zone, THE AUSTRALIAN, June 27, 2000. One critic said the 2000
Amendment "is emphatically not a privacy instrument, it is an attempt to legitimize a vast array of privacy
invasive activities of corporations." Id. The Standing Committee of Legal and Constitutional Affairs of
the House of Representatives of the Australian Parliament received 128 submissions while considering the
bill. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, INQUIRY
INTO THE PRIVACY AMENDMENT (PRIVATE SECTOR) BILL 2000, at http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/
laca/Privacybill/submiss.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
53 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 49; Wayne Adams, Law to Stop Private Data Going
Public, THE AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 17, 1998. While 58% of Australians accessed the Internet in 2002, only
15% purchased goods online. With a population of about six million adults, roughly 2.7 million adults are
online, yet do not use the Internet to purchase goods. See AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS,
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (ICT) INDICATORS, at http://www.abs.gov.au/Aus
stats/abs%40.nsf/94713ad445ffl425ca25682000192af2/7599f94ffdbadccbca256d97002c8636!OpenDocum
ent (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
54 See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 49, at 11.
5 Fed. Privacy Comm'r, Information Sheet 1. 2001 Overview of the Private Sector Provisions
(2001), at http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/ISl_01.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
6 Privacy Act, 1988, sched. 3. The National Privacy Principles are almost identical to the
Information Privacy Principles of the original Privacy Act.
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1) collection, 2) use and disclosure, 3) data quality, 4) data security, 5)
openness, 6) access and correction, 7) identifiers, 8) anonymity, 9)
transborder data flows, and 10) sensitive information. 7
There are a few provisions in particular that make the 2000
Amendment "co-regulatory., 58 The first is that the NPPs are only the default
standards. Private sector businesses can submit their own privacy codes to
the Federal Privacy Commissioner ("Commissioner") and, upon approval by
the Commissioner, be subject to their own privacy codes instead of being
bound by the NPPs. 59 In order for the Commissioner to approve a privacy
code, the code must "[incorporate] all the National Privacy Principles or set
out obligations that, overall, are at least the equivalent of all the obligations
set out in those Principles., 60  The second co-regulatory provision is that
businesses that are exempt from the 2000 Amendment may still opt-in to its
provisions by filling out an application form.61  The Commissioner must
keep a registry of businesses that have opted-in to the NPPs.
62
The third co-regulatory aspect of the 2000 Amendment is not one
specific provision, but a set of provisions and policy choices. The 2000
Amendment's enforcement scheme does not follow the "command and
control" regulatory model 63 in which the state and/or some private
individuals enforce the law in administrative or judicial tribunals. Instead,
the 2000 Amendment focuses on negotiation and arbitration to resolve
disputes about companies' privacy practices.64 It directs the Commissioner
to hear and resolve complaints brought by the public on alleged breaches of
the NPPs or approved privacy codes, 65 and to resolve complaints using
57 Id. at sched. 3.
58 "Co-regulation" is a regulatory scheme in which "industry develops rules for the protection of
privacy that are enforced by the industry and overseen by the privacy agency." INTERNATIONAL SURVEY,
supra note 2, at 4.
59 Privacy Act, 1988, § 16A.
60 Id. § 18BB(2)(a).
61 Fed. Privacy Comm'r, Opting-in to Coverage by the National Privacy Principles, at
http://www.privacy.gov.au/business/register/index.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
62 Privacy Act, 1988, § 6EA(3). Businesses may opt in to gain favor with consumers by showing a
special commitment to privacy or because they have already implemented sufficient privacy protection
measures.
63 The "command and control" regulatory model has been historically more common than
conciliatory methods and enforces the law through adjudication. William S. Laufer, Corporate
Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 643 (2002); Margot Priest,
The Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-Regulation, 29 OTTAWA L. REV. 233, 237-38 (1998).
However, the Australian Constitution explicitly recognizes conciliation and arbitration in the regulation of
industry and labor disputes. Breen Creighton, Labour Law: One Hundred Years of the Conciliation and
Arbitration Power: A Province Lost?, 24 MELBOURNE U. L. R. 839, 840-42 (2000).
6 See Privacy Act, 1988, § 27(1)(a).
65 Id. § 40(1).
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conciliation where possible.66  If conciliation is not possible, the
Commissioner can make a formal determination on whether a privacy
principle was breached.67 These determinations are not binding,68 although
the law states that a party may bring an action in Australian Federal Court to
enforce a determination.69 Anyone may bring an action in Federal Court for
an injunction against an organization that breached or will breach a privacy
principle.70  The 2000 Amendment also allows a business to name in its
approved privacy code an independent adjudicator who will hear complaints
of alleged privacy violations, instead of the Commissioner automatically
hearing those complaints.7' In addition, it allows a complainant to request
that the Commissioner review a determination made by an independent
adjudicator. Like the Commissioner's determinations, determinations
made by independent adjudicators are enforceable in Federal Court.73 Under
the 2000 Amendment, the Commissioner must keep a registry of all
determinations made. 74
The 2000 Amendment exempts small businesses (those with an
annual turnover 75 of less than A$3 million) from the new law unless they fit
into one of a few categories: 1) the small business provides a health service
to individuals and holds any health information; or 2) discloses personal
information about another individual to anyone else for a benefit, service, or
advantage; or 3) pays someone to collect personal information about another
individual from a third party.76
The 2000 Amendment requires that individuals be allowed to opt not
to receive marketing materials 77 (called the "opt-out, 78 approach). No part
of the 2000 Amendment requires a company to obtain consent before
collection and use of an individual's personal information occurs.79 While a
66 Id. § 27(l)(a).
67 Id.§52.65 Id. § 52(B)
69 Id. § 55A. The Court may conduct a hearing de novo on whether the respondent engaged in
conduct that interfered with the privacy of the complainant. Id. § 55A(5).
70 Id. § 98.
71 Id. § 18BB(3)(b).
72 Id. § 18BI(l).
71 Id. § 54(IA).
74 Id. § 80E.
75 Annual turnover is "defined to be the sum of the values of all supplies that an entity has made or is
likely to make during a 12 month period." Australian Bus. Register, ABR Help Glossary, at
http://www.help.abr.gov.au/content.asp?doc=/content/I 8257.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
76 Id. § 6D(4).
77 Id. at sched. 3 § 2.1(c)(iv).
7' Salbu, supra note 5, at 662.
79 Requiring consent before collection and/or use is called an "opt-in" approach. Id. at 661-62.
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company must tell individuals that it is collecting their information, 80 the
NPPs do not require a company to comply with individual's requests not to
collect or use that information.
81
Many of the 2000 Amendment's provisions, such as the opt-out
provision, have been criticized.82  Of these, two in particular stand out: the
small business exemption and the enforcement mechanisms.
III. THE SMALL BUSINESS EXEMPTION AND LIMITED ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS OF THE 2000 AMENDMENT COMPROMISE ITS ABILITY TO
PROVIDE MORE THAN NEGLIGIBLE INFORMATION PRIVACY
PROTECTION
Consumers, non-profit organizations, businesses, and other countries
have criticized the 2000 Amendment.8 3 Though many aspects of the law are
condemned as inadequate to protect Australians' privacy, the aspects of the
2000 Amendment that will most likely handicap it are the small business
exemption and insufficient enforcement provisions.
A. The Small Business Exemption Weakens Privacy Protection
The small business exemption84 is a particularly unpopular provision
of the 2000 Amendment.85  The A$3 million annual turnover threshold
exempts 94% of all Australian businesses that conduct 30% of total business
sales. 6  While the small business exemption may have been a politically
expedient compromise when the bill was passed,87 an effective and flexible
information privacy law cannot exempt so much business activity
indefinitely. The collection of personal information by small businesses can
go A company must take "reasonable steps" to notify the individual of the collection of information.
Privacy Act, 1988, at sched. 3 § 1.3.
a Unless that use is direct marketing, in which case an individual may opt-out. Privacy Act, 1988,
National Privacy Principle § 2. l(c)(iii).
82 See Kohel, infra note 83; E.C. Submission, supra note 51.
83 Australian Consumers' Association, Submission to Standing Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs 1, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/house/conmittee/lacalPrivacybill/sub30.pdf
(last visited Jan. 14, 2005); Deame, supra note 52; Hayes, supra note 14; Matthew Kohel, The Privacy
Amendment (Privacy Sector) Bill 2000. The Australian Government's Substandard Attempt to Allay
Privacy Concerns and Regulate Internet Privacy in the Private Sector, 27 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 703
(2002); INTERNATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 2, at 141.
The 2000 Amendment exempts any business with an annual turnover of A$3 million or less from
the provisions of the 2000 Amendment, unless a small business sells personal information or is paid to
collect it. Privacy Act, 1988, § 6D(4).
85 Privacy Exemption Queried, AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW, Aug. 25, 2000; Deame, supra note
52; Kohel, supra note 83, at 728-30.
86 See Gunning, supra note 10.
" See infra Part III.C.
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have a great impact on privacy.88 There is nothing inherent in a company's
size that would indicate its ability or inability to invade Australians' privacy
by misusing personal information. 89 A privacy breach will feel the same to
the individual whose privacy was breached whether a large or small
company caused that breach.
Consider, for example, identity theft, a rapidly growing crime. 90
Identity theft costs businesses millions,91 but it also imposes great costs on
victims who must spend hundreds, sometimes thousands of hours fixing the
problems caused by identity thieves. 92 Victims often run into problems for
years as poor credit ratings linger in their credit files.93 The identity theft
problem is only expected to worsen in the foreseeable future.94  Small,
technologically un-savvy businesses that use computers and software to
track their customers may be targeted by would-be identity thieves,
especially if basic security standards are not in place. Simple measures such
as encryption can deter identity theft caused by hacking or security breach
attempts from outsiders.
Proponents of the small business exemption may argue that small
businesses do not gather or use personal information often and that the
exemption in the 2000 Amendment is appropriate. 95 There are two problems
with this argument. First, it may be factually incorrect. It is thought that
small businesses incorporate cutting edge technological solutions to business
8 During legislative deliberation of the bill, the Federal Privacy Commissioner warned that the small
business exemption could prevent the Amendment from achieving its goal of increasing consumer
confidence in electronic commerce. F.P.C. Submission, supra note 9, at 7.
89 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, HANSARD 22366 (Nov. 8,
2000) (statement of Rep. Peter Andren), available at http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view-document
.aspx?id=494013&table=HANSARDR (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
90 Identity theft encompasses a number of different types of criminal activity and can range from
someone illegally using someone else's credit card, to the theft of an individual's entire identity to open
bank accounts, take out loans, and conduct other business illegally in that individual's name. AUSTRALIAN
NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAMME, ID THEFT-A KIT TO PREVENT AND RESPOND TO IDENTITY
THEFT (February 2004), at http://www.law.gov.au/www/ncpHome.nsf/Alldocs/RWP4lEA8OA3A8 1A49D
8CA256ElA0002A738?OpenDocument&highlight=identity/o2Otheft (last visited Jan. 14, 2005). Identity
theft is increasing by more than 50% annually in Australia. Denise Cullen, The Eyes Have It, THE AGE
(MELBOURNE), Mar. 24, 2003; 2003 Annual Report, supra note 47, at 9.91 Identity theft costs Australians four billion dollars (Australian) per year. Cullen, supra note 90.
92 For example, in the U.S., identity theft victims' out of pocket expenses totaled $1.5 billion from
January 2001 through July 2003. Like the U.S., identity theft was also very high in Australia. PRIVACY
AND AMERICAN BUSINESS, PRIVACY & AMERICAN BUSINESS SURVEY FINDS 33.4 MILLION AMERICANS
VICTIMS OF ID THEFT, CONSUMER OUT-OF-POCKET EXPENSES TOTAL $1.5 BILLION A YEAR (2003),
available at http://www.pandab.org/id-theftpr.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Privacy
SurveZ]. See CASLON ANALYTICS, PROFILE: IDENTITY THEFT, IDENTITY FRAUD (2003), at
http://www.caslon.com.aulidtheftprofile.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
Privacy Survey, supra note 92.
95 Privacy Exemption Queried, supra note 85.
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needs more slowly than large companies. 96 To the contrary, when the 2000
Amendment was passed, 70% of the Australian Information Industry
Association members, who accounted for 80% of high-tech revenues, were
small and medium sized businesses. 97 Even four years ago, the argument
that small businesses were not electronically gathering personal data was a
suspect assumption given the number of small businesses in the information
industry. 98  That argument is even less credible today when 96% of
Information and Computer Technology businesses are classified as small
businesses. 99
Even assuming small businesses did not in 2000 and do not now
gather significant amounts of personal data, the second problem with the
proponents' argument is that small businesses will collect and store personal
information in the future. As more and more companies convert records to
electronic files and increase the percentage of commercial transactions they
conduct electronically,' 00 businesses that cannot do so will be at a
disadvantage. 10' Such companies will lose business because consumers may
find paper transactions cumbersome, or because suppliers can no longer
accommodate non-electronic commercial transactions.10 2 Small businesses
may lag behind large ones in technology implementation, but that should not
forever exempt them from taking on the attendant responsibilities of the use
of technology.
If the small business exemption remains a part of the Privacy Act,
large companies may be driven to exploit it as a loophole to escape its
coverage. 1 3 Conglomerations of businesses that, in effect, are large enough
to fall within the 2000 Amendment's purview, may intentionally escape
obligation by categorizing parts of the business as affiliates (where each
"affiliate" has an annual turnover of less than A$3 million). 04 While
currently there is no evidence that large companies are exploiting the
exemption in this manner, they will face increasing pressure to do so if, in
the future, small businesses can gain an advantage by using personal data
96 Scarlet Pruitt, Web Conferencing Comes ofAge: Many Variables Will Help You Determine Which
Products and Services Fit Your Company's Needs, NETWORK WORLD, Mar. 31, 2003.
97 Deame, supra note 52.
98 Id.
99 AUSTRALIAN INFO. INDUS. ASSOC'N, SNAPSHOT OF THE AUSTRALIAN ICT INDUSTRY 1 (2004),
available at http://www.aiia.cmau/cgi-bin/dpms/dpr.cgi/dpmsref5/dpms/original/Industrynapshot.doc
(last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
'0o RONALD J. MANN & JANE K. WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 1 (2002).
'o' See id. at 4.
102 See id. at 244-45.
103 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 49, at 7.
104 Deame, supra note 52.
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without adhering to the National Privacy Principles.
Besides domestic privacy concerns, the small business exemption has
international implications. The E.U. Commission ("Commission"), through
its Data Protection Working Party,10 5 listed the small business exemption as
a concern in its submission to the Australian Parliament during consideration
of the 2000 Amendment.' 0 6  The Commission determines whether non-
European Union countries' data protection is adequate.10 7  To date, the
Commission has not approved Australia's data protection law under the
"adequacy" standard of the E.U. Directive.' 08  The E.U.'s disapproval of
Australia's privacy law has negative implications for the Australian
economy. In order to take full advantage of personal data collection in the
"information age," some companies may want to transfer data to and from
Europe. This is especially true for companies that have subsidiaries or
affiliates in both Australia and Europe. They experience a disadvantage
when they cannot transfer personal data freely from Europe.
Even if the E.U. determines that the 2000 Amendment adequately
protects personal data,10 9 small businesses would still be prohibited from
receiving data from E.U. businesses because they are not subject to the 2000
Amendment's provisions.' 10 Even if a small business voluntarily complies
with the 2000 Amendment, or the stricter E.U. Directive on Data Protection,
there is currently no agreement between Australia and the E.U. that would
allow it to transfer or receive personal data to or from Europe.II
The small business exemption is not minor. In fact, it exempts a large
number of businesses and business transactions. With the increasing use of
105 The European Commission is the executive branch of the European Union. European
Commission, About This Site, at http://europa.eu.int/comnm/abouten.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005). The
Data Protection Working Party was formed by the Commission to serve as its data protection experts. Data
Protection Working Party, Tasks of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 1, available at
http://europa.eu.int/conmm/intemal-market/privacy/docs/wpdcs/tasks-art-29-en.pdf (last visited Jan. 14,
2005).. E.C. Submission, supra note 51, at 3.
107 When a third country's protection is deemed adequate, personal data can be traded to that country
from the E.U. E.U. Directive, supra note 4, art. 25.
'0' The E.C. Submission of 2001 is the most recent opinion published by the Commission on
Australia's privacy law. Because Australia's law has not changed, the concerns voiced by the Commission
in the E.C. Submission are most likely the concerns that justify its finding that Australia does not have
adequate data protection laws.
109 It is very unlikely that the Commission will approve the 2000 Amendment as is given that the
Commission raised many concerns about the 2000 Amendment before it was passed that were not and have
not since been addressed. E.C. Submission, supra note 51.
I10 Id.
.. The U.S. has solved this problem by forming the "Safe Harbor" agreement with the E.U. under
which individual U.S. companies can voluntarily comply with the E.U. Directive and then be allowed to
trade personal data once the U.S. Department of Commerce certifies them. George et al., supra note 14, at
765.
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technology and the rise of data gathering, it could greatly undermine the
ability of the 2000 Amendment to function as it was intended.
B. The 2000 Amendment Lacks Adequate Enforcement Mechanisms
Unlike the small business exemption, which is only one specific
provision of the 2000 Amendment, enforcement is the product of many
provisions of the law."12  The criticism that the 2000 Amendment lacks
adequate enforcement mechanisms" 3 raises practical and theoretical
arguments that surface in the debate about how to regulate effectively and
efficiently.
Australia's 2000 Amendment relies on a combination of persuasion,
arbitration, and regulatory and judicial injunctions to enforce its provisions.
Businesses are allowed to write their own codes to govern their privacy
practices. 1 14 The Commissioner's office conducts outreach and education to
educate private firms on the requirements of the 2000 Amendment with the
hope that, once educated, businesses will comply."15 The Commissioner
also acts as an arbitrator when individuals submit written complaints about a
company's alleged privacy breach.16
Since passage of the 2000 Amendment, the Commissioner has
received 3044 complaints." 7  The Commissioner made four formal
determinations under the 2000 Amendment, but they all stemmed from
complaints about one company." 8 Because complaints increased by five-
fold after passage of the 2000 Amendment 1 9 and the Commissioner's
Budget was only increased to handle twice the pre-amendment number of
complaints,12 many complainants had to wait six months for a hearing.
21
112 For example, budgeting and funding choices can greatly affect enforcement efforts.
113 Dearne, supra note 52.
114 To date, three codes have been approved. Fed. Privacy Comm'r, Register of Approved Privacy
Codes (2004), at http://www.privacy.gov.au/business/codes/index.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
1 2003 Annual Report, supra note 47, at 15.
116 Privacy Act, 1988, § 27(l)(ac)(Austl.).
"7 Complaint statistics are through May 31, 2004. Fed. Privacy Comm'r, Complaints and Enquiries
Statistics to the End of May 2004, at http://www.privacy.gov.au/about/complaints/index.html (last visited
Jan. 14, 2005).
I' See Fed. Privacy Comm'r, Complaint Case Notes and Complaint Determinations, at
http://www.privacy.gov.au/act/casenotes/index.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Complaint
Case Notes]. The respondent was a company that collected and sold information about tenants to landlords
so landlords could assess and minimize the risks of renting property to particular tenants. Two Tenants'
Unions brought four complaints alleging numerous violations of the Privacy Act. The Commissioner
determined that seven of the alleged violation of the NPPs occurred while two alleged violations of the
NPPs did not.
119 2003 Annual Report, supra note 47, at 10.
120 Id. § 62.
121 id. § 10.
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Budget problems also forced the Commissioner to cut back on community
outreach and education efforts.'22
The NPPs are enforced through the courts and private conciliation
sessions. 23 Besides the right to file a complaint with the Commissioner, the
2000 Amendment grants citizens or the Commissioner the right to sue in
federal court for injunctive relief.124  So far one case has been brought in
federal court and relief was partially granted. 125 In addition to complaints or
lawsuits filed by individuals, the Commissioner can independently
investigate an act or practice of a company if the act or practice interferes
with the privacy of an individual. 126 If the Commissioner finds that such act
or practice breaches the NPPs, however, he cannot issue a determination or
any penalties. 27 The Commissioner investigated 112 matters in the period
from July 2001 through June 2003.128 A very small number of the outcomes
of these investigations appear in news releases 129 or in the Commissioner's
annual report. 130
Australia's "co-regulatory" approach is embodied in its enforcement
scheme. Its middle of the road provisions attempt to split the difference
between comprehensive state regulation and self-regulation.131 Since the
advent of administrative agencies, many commentators have debated
whether regulation or deregulation is appropriate and to what extent entities
should be allowed to regulate themselves.' 2 In an influential book called
"Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate"'133 Ian
2 Id. § 13.
123 Supra Part HI.A.
:24 Privacy Act, 1988, § 98 (Austl.).
25 Seven Network (Operations) Ltd. v Media Entrn't & Arts Alliance (2004) F.C.A. 637, 2004 WL
1158696.
:26 Privacy Act, 1988, § 40.127 2003 Annual Report, supra note 47, at 74.
128 Id. at 74-75. The report does not say how many of those matters involved private sector
businesses covered by the 2000 Amendment. It did note that there was an increase of sixteen investigations
in the 2002-2003 reporting year over the 2001-2002 reporting year. The 2000 Amendment became
effective in December 2001.
129 See FEDERAL PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, DEPUTY FEDERAL PRIVACY COMMISSIONER CONCLUDES
HARTS INVESTIGATION (Feb. 2, 2001), available at http://www.privacy.gov.au/news/01Ol0.html (last
visited Jan. 14, 2005).
13o 2003 Annual Report, supra note 47, at 74-75.
131 Europe's Data Protection Directive calls for the creation of a central administrative privacy agency
as well as private rights of action in court to seek damages. E.U. Directive, supra note 4. In contrast, the
United States allows private rights of action in some of its sector specific laws, but generally relies on
market and self-regulation. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 392-94.
12 See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 3 (1992).
133 Id. Ayres and Braithwaite argue that the regulation versus deregulation debate is stale and that a
better view is to look at the interplay between state regulation and private orderings. Many other scholars
have used Ayres and Braithwaite's regulatory response model when proposing or discussing the
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Ayres and John Braithwaite propose ways in which private regulation and
state regulation can supplement and support each other. 134 They argue that
lawmakers should seek to find the right balance so that society does not
waste resources on excessive regulatory measures that are costly, yet provide
no added value in accomplishing legislative goals.' 35  Among other things,
they introduce the "pyramid" enforcement model, 136 which uses both self-
regulation and state-regulation to achieve the most compliance with the least
Cost. 137 Ayres and Braithwaite's work is especially useful in evaluating the
2000 Amendment because of its novelty as a "co-regulatory" framework.
The overall enforcement strategy of the 2000 Amendment may induce
compliance from many businesses subject to the 2000 Amendment.' 38
However, the 2000 Amendment's enforcement mechanisms are inadequate
because they are ill-equipped to deal with repeat violators or with business
entities that will not comply with the law because compliance costs more
than non-compliance. 39  The 2000 Amendment's ability to protect
individuals' privacy will suffer in the future unless a few simple changes are
made to its enforcement scheme.
1. The 2000 Amendment Has No "Pyramid" of Deterrents
An important element in effective enforcement of a law is that
regulatory responses be tailored to match the mindset and behavior of a
effectiveness of regulatory schemes. See NEIL GUNNINGHAM & RICHARD JOHNSTONE, REGULATING
WORKPLACE SANCTIONS: SYSTEMS AND SANCTIONS 10, 114-29 (1999) (advocating for the use of a
responsive regulatory model in the context of workplace safety); Richard W. Painter, Game Theoretic and
Contractarian Paradigms in the Uneasy Relationship Between Regulators and Regulatory Lawyers, 65
FORDHAM L. REv. 149, 199 (1996) (arguing for the use of a regulatory response pyramid in the regulation
of attorney conduct); Laufer, supra note 63, at 643-44 (describing the use of the enforcement pyramid
regulatory strategy in the Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations); Sidney A. Shapiro, American
Regulatory Policy: Have We Found the "Third Way"?, 48 KAN. L. REv. 689, 731-32 (2000) (discussing
responsive regulation as one option in reforming administrative enforcement of the law); John T. Scholz,
Enforcement Policy and Corporate Misconduct: The Changing Perspective of Deterrence Theory, 60 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 253, 259 (1997) (describing a cooperative strategy and enforcement pyramid in the
context of corporate enforcement); Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Integrative Regulation: A
Principle-Based Approach to Environmental Policy, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 853, 864-66 (1999)
(describing the enforcement pyramid in the context of environmental regulation).
' AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 132, at 3.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 35-44. See infra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of the pyramid model in the context of
Australia's private sector privacy law.
13' AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 132, at 38.
138 Most people, and even businesses, will comply with the law simply because it is the law. See id.
at 19.
139 See id.
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given regulated entity. 140  A regulatory response that uses only punishment
will undermine the good will of regulated entities that are motivated by a
sense of responsibility.141  At the same time, regulated entities that are
motivated only by money and will break the law if it is economically
advantageous to do so, should be subject to punitive deterrents
commensurate with their level of recalcitrance. 142  Ayres and Braithwaite
use the word "pyramid" because the pyramid shape conveys both the kind of
strategy used to exact compliance, and how often a particular strategy is
used.1
43
An effective regulatory response pyramid would be built as follows: at
the base of the pyramid (the lowest and widest section) are the regulatory
strategies the enforcing agency uses most often.'" These should be
cooperative strategies like persuasion and education. 45  Because most
regulated entities are socially responsible and will try to follow the law
simply because it is the law, 14 6 a cooperative stance coupled with a strategy
of persuasion and education will result in substantial compliance. 147  If
cooperation and persuasion do not work on a particular regulated entity, the
agency should move up the pyramid to a stronger, more punitive response. 148
For example, a warning letter may be the appropriate next step. '4  As the
agency moves up the pyramid, responses become harsher. 50  The tapered
shape of the pyramid shows that the frequency of use of the response
decreases as the response gets more and more harsh.' 5' This means that the
harshest penalties at the top of the pyramid, for example business license
revocation or very high monetary penalties, will be very rarely used.'
52
140 See generally id. at ch. 2. Ayres and Braithwaite argue that agencies do best at achieving their
goals when they strike a balance between punishment and persuasion when exacting compliance. Id. at 2 1.
141 Id. at 24. Ayres and Braithwaite argue that a punitive posture on the part of the agency is
undesirable because it projects negative expectations, inhibits self-regulation, and may encourage a culture
of resistance. Id. at 25.
142 See id. at ch. 2.
141 Id. at 35.
144 Id.
145 Id.
141 Id. at 19.
147 Self-regulation can be incorporated into the pyramid by allowing businesses or industries to form
independent investigating or adjudicating bodies, as in the case of the independent adjudicator provision of
the 2000 Amendment. Id. at 106. See Privacy Act, 1988, § 18BB(3)(b) (Austl.). Ayres and Braithwaite
discuss a model called "enforced self-regulation" where the state monitors and audits industry's self-
regulation. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 132, at 101-103.
148 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 132, at 35.
149 Id.
"o Id. at 35-36.
151 Id.
152 Instead of "speak softly and carry a big stick" the metaphor could be modified to "speak softly and
carry carrots and a number of sizes of sticks, making sure that you have a big stick." See Hugh Collins,
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There are two ways the 2000 Amendment's enforcement strategy
diverges from the pyramid model. First, the 2000 Amendment does not
require the Commissioner to publish a list of violations and the
corresponding regulatory responses. It does not specify what kinds of
violations will result in what kinds of penalties, nor does it require the
Commissioner or independent adjudicators to publish guidelines. In order
for a regulatory strategy to work, those regulated must know what behavior
will result in what regulatory reaction. This allows regulated entities to plan,
and it is simply fair: people and businesses are entitled to know the
consequences of their actions. In addition, the mere publication of the
enforcement response strategy, if equipped with a sufficiently harsh
response at the top of the pyramid, will arguably result in greater
compliance.' 53 Those who might exploit the system will be deterred by the
punishments at the top of the pyramid. Those who follow the law because of
a sense of social responsibility will feel that their compliance is validated,
knowing that their efforts to comply will receive support from the
government, and that the "bad actors" who try to cheat will receive
appropriate punishment.'1
54
The second way the enforcement mechanisms stray from the pyramid
scheme is that the 2000 Amendment does not provide for a wide range of
escalating punishments. The Commissioner is to use conciliation to resolve
alleged breaches of privacy.155 This approach fits the enforcement pyramid
model in that the response is to use education, negotiation, and other
persuasive tactics as the first regulatory response. 56 The Commissioner
may require that a respondent to a complaint cease any actions that invade
the complainant's privacy, 57 take action to redress loss or damage suffered
by the complainant, 58 or pay money to the complainant to redress loss or
damage. 59 There are no provisions, however, for increasing punishment for
repeat offenders. The 2000 Amendment also does not allow the
Commissioner to bring an action or issue a penalty or sanction independent
Book Review, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 523, 524 (1999) (reviewing REGULATING WORKPLACE
SAFETY: SYSTEMS AND SANCTIONS (Neil Gunningham & Richard Johnstone eds., 1999)).153 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 132, at 40-41.
154 See id. at 26. A regulatory strategy that sufficiently punishes the cheaters, will support the sense of
fairness in those who play by the rules. Id. That sense of fairness is important in preserving voluntary
compliance. Id.
155 Privacy Act, 1988, § 27(l)(a) (Austl.).
156 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 132, at 35.
157 Privacy Act, 1988, § 52(l)(b)(i)(B).
'58 Id. § 52(l)(b)(ii).
"' Id. § 52(l)(b)(iii). Loss or damage can include injury to the complainant's feelings or humiliation
suffered by the complainant. Id. § 52(IA).
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of a complaint brought by an individual. 160  In this sense the range of
punishments available and even whether or not the punishment applies is
very dependent upon the individual complainant. To the extent that privacy
means different things for different people, enforcement outcomes will
vary.161 Such disparate results undermine the appearance of fairness that an
effective regulatory scheme requires. Furthermore, private businesses
appreciate and deserve predictability in the enforcement scheme. 1
62
2. The 2000 Amendment Does Not Set Out Tough Deterrents
The 2000 Amendment contains no explicit mention of any harsh
deterrents. Under the Pyramid theory, this kind of deterrent would be
reserved until other less harsh responses (the lower part of the enforcement
pyramid) had been ruled Out. 16 3 Currently, the Commissioner may award
only actual damages to complainants.' 64  Without the power to fine
businesses for privacy breaches that affect many individuals, generalized
widespread harms may be very difficult to redress.165  Complainants can
aggregate their cases into a representative complaint;' 66 but unless they
follow that procedure (and it appears none have, so far, against the private
sector), the Commissioner cannot independently issue punishments
according to the aggregate effects of a privacy breach. 167 Often,
inappropriate disclosures of large databases of personal information result in
little to no compensable harm to many of the individuals whose personal
information is contained in the database.' 68 Punitive awards, which might
compensate for such large or egregious privacy breaches, are not available to
the Commissioner under the Privacy Act.
160 Id. § 52(1).
1 Even a business that blatantly disregards individuals' privacy may receive a light punishment
because the complainant was not particularly affected or concerned about a privacy breach.
162 Determining when a specific individual will complain is probably harder than knowing when an
agency will initiate an action, especially if the agency has published its enforcement guidelines.
163 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 132, at 30.
16 Privacy Act, 1988, §§ 52(l)-(lA).
165 See National Party Communications & Information Technology Policy Committee, Submission to
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Regarding the Inquiry
into Privacy Amendment (Privacy Sector) Bill 2000 at 23, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/house/
committee/laca/Privacybill/sub36.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
166 Privacy Act, 1988, §§ 38-39. A representative complaint is called a class action lawsuit in the
United States.
167 A privacy breach may significantly damage the reputation of electronic commerce, yet there is no
way to adequately address that harm.
168 See Dearne, supra note 52.
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Effective enforcement of the 2000 Amendment will also depend on
how the enforcing agency, the Commissioner's Office, is perceived. 169  The
2000 Amendment does not allow the Commissioner to issue penalties or
sanctions without investigating a complaint. 170  In practice this may not
affect most violations since many privacy breaches worth investigating will
produce complaints.' 71 Instead, this may create a problem of image. An
agency charged with enforcing a law should appear to have (and actually
have) some powerful deterrents at hand, even if its stance is usually
cooperative and conciliatory. 172 In fact, an agency that has the ability to use
powerful deterrents is better able to achieve compliance through persuasion
and cooperation because its opinion will have force. 173  A regulatory
enforcement strategy that uses only cooperation and persuasion cannot be
effective, since not all private businesses will follow the law simply because
it is the law.' 74  An agency, like the Commissioner's Office, that is
essentially a moderator of disputes and an educator,' 75 cannot provide the
punitive deterrent needed to achieve optimal compliance.
Under the 2000 Amendment as currently implemented, the threat of
financial sanctions is unlikely to sufficiently deter privacy breaching
behavior on the part of businesses motivated only by economic rationality.
So far, the Federal Privacy Commissioner has awarded monetary
compensation to only one complainant. 176  The damage award in that case
was A$1000.177 Most businesses covered by the act have an annual turnover
169 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 132, at 19.
170 Privacy Act, 1988, § 52.
17 ' Australians have shown that they are very willing to bring their complaints to the Commissioner.
After passage of the 2000 Amendment, complaints increased by a factor of five. 2003 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 47, at 10. Originally, they were expected only to double. Id. at 62.
172 See AYREs & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 132, at 19.
173 id.
174 See id. at 24. Ayres and Braithwaite cite a 1971 study of the United States Office of Price
Administration. Id. at 26. The author of the study concluded that 20% of firms would comply
unconditionally with any rule, 5% would attempt to evade it, and the remaining 75% were likely to comply,
but only if the punitive threat to the dishonest 5% was credible. Id.
"' See infra Part III.B.4 for a discussion of the Commissioner's role as arbitrator.
176 There are five published case notes interpreting the 2000 Amendment as it applies to the private
sector. Complaint Case Notes, supra note 118.
177 Fed. Privacy Comm 'r, 2003 - Complaints Case Note 9, at http://www.privacy.gov.au/act/
casenotes/ccn9_03.htrnl (last visited Jan. 14, 2005). In that case a financial institution accidentally linked
complainants' account to a family member's account. Id. The financial institution sent the complainants'
financial information to the family member who, upon seeing complainants' financial status required
complainants to provide a A$1000 guarantee in relation to financial dealings between complainant and the
family member. Id. The financial institution agreed to compensate complainants AS1000. The
Commissioner closed the complaint because the matter had been adequately resolved. Id.
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of greater than A$3 million. 78 Based on the low risk that the business will
be fined at all, and the fact that so far fines have been negligible, an
economically rational business that does not feel the need to follow the law
simply because it is the law, will not spend much money on improving its
privacy practices.
The Commissioner needs stronger sanctions to appropriately respond
to unlawful behavior. In addition, availability of highly punitive responses
will allow the Commissioner to make full use of the range of enforcement
mechanisms, including cooperation and persuasion.
3. The 2000 Amendment Does Not Give Sufficient Rights to Sue in
Federal Court
Limited legal recourse further weakens the enforcement of privacy
legislation. The 2000 Amendment gives very limited access to the
Australian federal courts. Recourse to the court system is available only
after the Commissioner makes a formal determination, 179 or to seek
injunctive relief180  Citizens may have limited rights to appeal a non-
determination decision of the Commissioner to the courts under the
Administrative (Judicial Review) Act 1977,181 but section 64 of the Privacy
Act (1988) precludes a right of action to challenge decisions of the
Commissioner made in good faith. 8 2 In addition, the 2000 Amendment
states that "a determination of the Commissioner... is not binding or
conclusive between any of the parties to the determination."' 83 Even if most
parties in a proceeding before the Commissioner will comply with the
Commissioner's recommendations because they are responsible and law-
abiding, there is no recourse against cheaters or even very inept actors who
fail to properly implement the Commissioner's recommendations. Allowing
the Commissioner, or even a citizen, to enforce orders in court enhances
fairness as well as the ability of the Commissioner to keep the base of the
"' The small business exemption exempts most of the businesses with annual turnover of less than
A$3 million from the provisions of the 2000 Amendment. At the current exchange rate of US $0.77 to
AS 1.00, the turnover rate is US $2.31 million. Currency Exchange Rates, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2004, at
C12.
:79 Privacy Act, 1988, § 55A (Austl.).
"s Id. § 98.
1s1 No suits have yet been brought under the Administrative (Judicial Review) Act of 1977 over
privacy breaches.
2 Privacy Act, 1988, § 64.
:s3 Id. § 52(1B).
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enforcement pyramid wide by using fewer punitive measures in most
cases. 
18 4
The 2000 Amendment's minimal recourse to judicial enforcement
creates two other related problems. First, the majority of privacy disputes
are resolved in private conciliation sessions, so the operation of the law is
hidden from public scrutiny. 85 The public cannot discuss and debate
implementation of the 2000 Amendment when that implementation is
hidden. Furthermore, a failure by Parliament to acknowledge that
information privacy is sufficiently important to warrant recourse to the
courts fails to legitimate citizens' information privacy concerns and
undermines the notion that information privacy is a "public" issue.
Excessive limits on judicial enforcement give rise to another problem:
a potential lack of uniformity in interpretation of the 2000 Amendment. 186
This is especially true considering there is no required systemic review of
the complaint system. In practice, the Commissioner's resolution of most
disputes may indeed be uniform, but uniform dispute outcomes do not lead
to uniform interpretation and implementation of the law. If resolutions are
not published, or only minimally published, or if costly records requests
must be made to the Commissioner to review decisions, businesses' ability
to tailor their privacy codes and practices to accepted standards is greatly
lessened. In addition, there is no guarantee that decisions made under the
2000 Amendment are actually uniform. The Commissioner's Office is a
federal agency that educates, enforces, investigates and advises. 87 Unlike a
court of law, its mandate is not to uphold or foster the rule of law or fairprocess.188  Therefore, increasing opportunities to enforce the 2000
Amendment in the court system would promote open and uniform
implementation of Australia's privacy law.
'84 See AYRES & BRArrHWAITE, supra note 132, at 41, for a discussion of the effect of the height of
the enforcement pyramid on its shape. A tall pyramid (an enforcement scheme with severe responses
available) is also wider at its base; cooperative strategies are used more often.
185 See Deame, supra note 52.
186 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, HANSARD 20158 (Nov. 29, 2000) (statement of
Sen. Nick Bolkus), available at http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/viewdocument.aspx?id=609729
&table=HANSARDS (last visited Jan. 14, 2005). "Different codes, inconsistencies and inconsistent
regimes in different sectors across the country basically give you a legislative mess. They give you an
unworkable system." Id.
187 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 14.
'88 See Wiest v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions (1988) 86 A.L.R. 464, 486; Ainsworth Nominees
Proprietary Ltd. Trading v. Crouch, CA 40686 of 1993, 1995 NSW LEXIS 11763, at *l1 (N.S.W. App. Ct.
July 18, 1995).
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
4. The 2000 Amendment Overemphasizes Conciliation in the Resolution
of Privacy Disputes
The 2000 Amendment requires the Commissioner to settle disputes
using conciliation if the Commissioner thinks it is appropriate.18 9  The
debate regarding the respective merits of alternative dispute resolution and
adjudication is not within the scope of this Comment.'9" A few major
points, however, will show why information privacy may be more fairly
resolved in adjudicatory settings rather than conciliation sessions arbitrated
by the Commissioner. To the extent that conciliation focuses on
appeasement or restoration of goodwill, 191 it can neglect the substance of the
outcome. 192  Legitimate value and interest conflicts can become
"communication" problems. 193  Some scholars argue that certain kinds of
disputes-constitutional or public law disputes-are not appropriate for
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"). 194 Scholars argue that the process of
adjudication ensures the proper resolution and application of public values,
whereas ADR emphasizes resolution of conflict using non-legal community
or individual values.
195
Information privacy is not constitutionally protected. However, many
argue that privacy is a fundamental human right, the existence of which
coincides with humane government,' 96 and so it may be exactly the kind of
"public law" that is well-suited to adjudication. i97
Another criticism leveled at ADR is that power imbalances between
parties and a lack of procedural safeguards can lead to ill-informed decisions
189 Privacy Act, 1988, § 27(1)(ab).
190 For a discussion of the issues surrounding the debate about alternative dispute resolution, see
Richard L. Abel, The Contradictions ofInformal Justice, in I THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 267,
267-310 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982); Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law:
Hierarchy and Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1
(1993); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668
Webster's defines the verb "conciliate" as follows: "to gain (as goodwill) by pleasing acts 2) to
make compatible: reconcile 3) appease: to become friendly or agreeable." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 239 (Frederick C. Mish et al. eds., 10th ed. 1996).
192 See Abel, supra note 190, at 293-94; Nader, supra note 190, at 8.
:93 Nader, supra note 190, at 8.
94 Edwards, supra note 190, at 671.
'9' Id. at 675-76.
'9 OECD Guidelines, supra note 18; International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23,
1976, art. 17, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("[N]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy.")
Some have also pointed out the economic gains created by privacy protection. See generally Richard S.
Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381
(1996).
17 Edwards, supra note 190, at 671.
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that are less fair or just than decisions produced by adjudicative bodies.
198
Richard Abel, professor at UCLA School of Law and respected legal author,
criticizes ADR for improperly neutralizing conflict in heterogeneous
societies. 199 He argues that ADR neutralizes conflict by individualizing it:
ADR isolates grievants from each other and inhibits perception of common
grievances. 00 Isolated grievants are more likely to give up, even though
their complaints may be substantial. 20 1 Finally, ADR's purported virtues,
that it is faster and less expensive than adjudication, may be less significant
than its proponents claim they are.202
Both the Commissioner and the Parliament should consider these
serious concerns about ADR if they contemplate changing Australia's
private sector privacy law. For example, the Commissioner could publish
procedural guidelines for complaints. Parliament should consider lessening
the emphasis on "conciliation," increasing rights of action in court, creating
procedures for complaints, or all three.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Parliament can incorporate a number of simple measures into the 2000
Amendment to ameliorate the significant shortcomings caused by the small
business exemption and inadequate enforcement mechanisms. First, the
small business exemption should be eliminated or narrowed. Enforcement
mechanisms should be improved by applying increasingly harsh regulatory
responses to increasingly recalcitrant behavior, and by allowing the
Commissioner to issue harsh penalties for egregious violations. Improved
access to the court system would further increase fair and efficient
enforcement of the law. Finally, both the Federal Privacy Commissioner
and Parliament should consider increasing education efforts to improve
Australians' understanding of data collection and privacy protection.
A. The Small Business Exemption Should Be Closed or Narrowed
First, Parliament should narrow or eliminate the small business
exemption. This could be done gradually so that businesses can make use of
protocols and systems developed by businesses already subject to the 2000
' Id. at 679.
199 Abel, supra note 190, at 280, 285. Abel argues that heterogeneous societies naturally have more
conflict than homogeneous ones and that trying to use systems like ADR that work well in homogeneous
societies is improper. Id. at 285.
"0 Id. at 288-89.
201 id.
'0' See id. at 298.
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Amendment. Gradually closing the small business exemption loophole
would give small businesses time to educate themselves and the
Commissioner time to develop guidelines to assist small businesses in
implementing the law. Small businesses that store personal data can and
should implement at least basic privacy measures that are simple and
inexpensive. To promote fairness and consistency, small businesses that
incorporate more technology and data storage into their businesses, should
be held to the same basic standards of care as large corporations that have
already been using that technology.
B. The 2000 Amendment's Enforcement Mechanisms Should Be
Improved
A number of changes could improve enforcement of the 2000
Amendment. First, the Commissioner should develop and publish, or
Parliament should require development of an enforcement "pyramid." The
Commissioner should publish guidelines that show what enforcement
responses will correspond to what kinds of breaches or non-compliant
behavior. Regulatory responses should increase (become more punitive) in
response to continued non-compliance and decrease with compliant
behavior.
Second, the 2000 Amendment should be amended to specifically
include more punitive deterrents. 23  There are many deterrent options
available. Adverse publicity can be a harsh sanction because many
corporations place a high value on a good reputation. 204 Punitive damages
can be assessed in response to especially egregious or repeat violations.
Recourse to the court system through a private right of action can also be a
strong deterrent. 20 5 Business license suspension may also be considered for
the most egregious non-compliant behavior. Under a pyramid system these
harsher punishments will be used less often than the conciliatory or
persuasive responses.
203 Ayres and Braithwaite would say that the height of the pyramid should be increased. See AYRES
& BRAITHWAITE, supra note 132, at 41.
204 Id. at 22.
20' Because of business's fear of litigation, rights of action can be deterrents in and of themselves
regardless of the available remedies. Kimberlianne Podlas, The Monster in the Television: The Media's
Contribution to the Consumer Litigation Boogeyman, 44 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 239, 239 (2004);
Deborah A. Ballam, Employment References-Speak No Evil, Hear No Evil: A Proposal for Meaningful
Reform, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 445, 447-48 (2002). In order to retain predictability, private rights of action
should be limited by specific standards of review and should be available only after administrative
remedies have been exhausted.
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Third, the 2000 Amendment should include more access to the court
system. Judicial review promotes uniformity, increases public awareness,
and bolsters the Commissioner's ability to influence businesses' behavior.
Though ultimate recourse to the court system is ideal, it is also important to
consider why access to the courts was so limited in the 2000 Amendment
and why increasing access to the courts after initial passage is more
politically feasible. Businesses and free-market enthusiasts often argue that
excessive litigation is a main reason for the "ossification" of the
administrative process. 20 6  Those who favor self-regulation and reliance on
the market to regulate interactions, argue that such regulation is more
efficient. 20 7  They argue that the extensive procedural requirements of
rulemaking and frequent litigation bog down administrative regulation,
which in turn increases costs and delay. 208 Finally, litigation is a source of
concern to businesses because litigation is expensive and often
unpredictable.209
In the case of information privacy laws, some of these concerns are
reasonable. The public's understanding of technology and data use is
minimal. 2  Accordingly, individuals may not have a strong sense of the
information privacy they want or need. Some individuals may be very
sensitive to use of their personal information and others may not notice or
particularly care.21 It is difficult to set legal standards in this kind of social
climate because actions that constitute a breach and the appropriate remedies
are not yet clear. Two important points arise from this discussion. First, it is
appropriate to use persuasion and conciliation, as espoused currently in the
206 Legal scholars have used the term "ossification" to describe the slowing or halting altogether of
rulemaking by agencies. Anthony Bertelli, Developing a Common Law of Cost Benefit Analysis: A
Rational Choice InstitutionalAnalysis, 15 J.L. & POL. 717, 718 (1999).
207 See Angela J. Campbell, Seif-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 711, 716 (1999).
208 Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J.
1385, 1385-86 (1992).
209 Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a Better Way: Litigation,
Alternatives, and Accommodation: Background Paper, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 830, 842 (1989).
210 Jeff Sovem, Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REv.
1305, 1327 (2001). The author cites a number of sources describing consumers' ignorance about
business's collection of personal information. Id. at n. 73; Sovern, supra note 1, at 1071-74; see also
JOSEPH TUROW, ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, AMERICANS & ONLINE PRIVACY: THE SYSTEM IS
BROKEN (June 2003), at http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/04_infosociety/2003
_onlineprivacyversion_09.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2005) (showing that Americans were ignorant about
privacy practices in that many mistakenly assumed that a company with a privacy policy would not share
personal data).
211 See Alan F. Westin, "Whatever Works": The American Public's Attitudes Toward Regulation and
Self-Regulation on Consumer Privacy Issues, in U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PRIVACY AND SELF-
REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1997), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/
selfregl.htm#1F (last visited Jan. 14, 2005). Westin characterizes 25% of the American public as "Privacy
Fundamentalists," 55% as "Privacy Pragmatists," and 20% as "Privacy Unconcerned." Id.
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2000 Amendment, for most disputes because actors on both sides of a
transaction will be acting in good faith and honestly trying to do the right
thing. Second, as the public, the private sector, and the Commissioner learn
more about information privacy in the private sector, it will be easier to
create legal standards that can be applied in court. For example, after
receiving thousands of complaints 21 2 and resolving almost as many, the
Commissioner will likely have learned which breaches are minor, which are
moderate, and which are major. The legislature should take advantage of the
experience and knowledge gained in the last three years to craft fair and
predictable legal standards that can be applied in court.
C. Australians' Attitudes About Privacy Should Be Considered When
Making Changes to the 2000 Amendment
The Australian Parliament needs to set aside funds to educate
consumers about information privacy. Consumers should be educated on
typical industry practices as well as potential risks213 of the collection and
use of personal information. Parliament and the Commissioner also need to
be sure that companies notify consumers of the intended uses of their
personal information.
Parliament can choose enforcement mechanisms that free up resources
to increase public education. Measures to reduce the budget problems faced
by the Commissioner's Office would allow the other changes suggested here
to have the greatest effect. Industry could be allowed and encouraged to
self-enforce (with auditing and oversight by the Commissioner), which takes
advantage of industries' expertise to enforce the law more efficiently. 21 4
These measures should relieve some of the financial pressure on the
Commissioner, who can then increase outreach and education. However,
Parliament should also consider expressly allocating more money to educate
consumers about privacy. This would serve the valuable democratic ideal of
having an informed populace, but also would allow Australians to decide
what privacy protection they desire. This, in turn, would remove some of the
uncertainty surrounding social expectations of privacy.
212 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 15.
213 Risks include economic risks, such as lost time and opportunities because of identity theft, as well
as moral and social risks, as when a person's sensitive purchasing habits are indiscriminately viewable by
company employees.214 Public interest groups could also monitor enforcement efforts under a "tri-partism" model which
would serve dual purposes of taking some of the burden off the Commissioner, as well as allowing the
Commissioner to form cooperative relationships with industry. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note
132, at 54.
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Proponents of the 2000 Amendment may argue that Australians
achieved the privacy protection they desired, even if it has serious
shortcomings. An alternative possibility is that Australians actually wanted
stronger information privacy protection, but were willing to settle for the
2000 Amendment because they saw it as a first step in a line of increasing
legal protections and because gradual implementation would lower overall
implementation costs, or because they were unsure about the current state of
data collection. Speculating about the "political will" of the people is
difficult, but some analysis of public attitudes provides relevant information.
Studies tend to show that consumers do not have a particularly good
understanding of personal data collection. 215 In such a political climate, the
default should not be to adopt laws with large loopholes and weak
enforcement mechanisms. If minimal protection is desired, the substantive
portion of the law (the NPPs in this case) should be changed to reflect that
desire, rather than rendering the law inconsistent and unfair through
exemptions and inadequate enforcement.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the current state of flux of data collection, regulating
information privacy is like trying to hit a moving target. Australia's 2000
Amendment was an innovative approach to regulation of an amorphous
subject. Yet the small business exemption and its enforcement mechanisms
are serious flaws. By addressing these flaws, the Australian government can
provide effective privacy protection, while remaining flexible to changing
business and citizen needs. Small businesses that are not currently subject to
the Privacy Act can benefit from lessons learned while implementing the
2000 Amendment over the last four years. The Federal Privacy
Commissioner can act as a resource for businesses' self-regulatory efforts
and can persuade and educate them on what is needed for compliance. But
government also needs the power to administer punitive responses. A fair
enforcement system is cooperative, open, appropriate, and holds sufficiently
punitive responses in reserve. When regulated entities believe that
regulation is fair, they are likely to cooperate. A system that works mostly
by cooperation is efficient and maximizes outcomes for all involved.
The particulars of regulatory schemes are important, but it is also
important to have an informed populace. To that end, Parliament should
emphasize outreach and education on privacy issues. A scheme that reflects
the sentiments of an informed citizenry will be stronger, fairer, and more
211 See Sovern, supra note 210.
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efficient.
The 2000 Amendment has clear, moderately strong, substantive
privacy protection in the form of the NPPs, but these principles are not being
given force. Currently, the small business exemption is too large a loophole.
The enforcement provisions are weak. In the name of consistency and
fairness, the substantive provisions of the 2000 Amendment should be given
force. To do so, the small business exemption should be phased out, and the
enforcement mechanisms modified to provide appropriate, predictable
responses.
